In two-player two-strategy games the Bishop-Cannings theorem of the classical evolutionary game theory does not permit pure evolutionarily stable strategies (ESSs) when a mixed ESS exists. We find the necessary form of two-qubit initial quantum states when a switch-over to a quantum version of the game also changes the evolutionarily stability of a mixed symmetric Nash equilibrium (NE).
Introduction
Quantum game theory has gained considerable interest recently. In a pioneering work, Meyer [1] , presented the idea of playing a sequential game in a quantum way by unitary manipulation of a qubit. A measurement of the final quantum state of the qubit gives the payoffs to the players. Eisert, Wilkens, and Lewenstein [2] , focussing on the concept of Nash equilibrium (NE) [3] from noncooperative game theory, they extended the famous game of prisoner's dilemma to quantum domain. Using a maximally entangled two-qubit initial quantum state, they showed that the dilemma disappears in quantum domain. Later Marinatto and Weber [4] following a different approach studied the game of battle of sexes in quantum setting, showing that the introduction of entangled strategies leads to a unique solution of this game. Moreover, they showed that the classical game corresponds to an un-entangled initial quantum state.
An important question in quantum game theory is to draw a comparison with the corresponding classical version of the game. In classical game theory, there is well developed mathematical formalism to study the evolutionary dynamics of a population consists of interacting individuals [5, 6] . It is interesting to extend this formalism to quantum domain and compare the predictions of classical and quantum game-theoretical models of evolution. In other words, how the established evolutionary concepts of mathematical biology -based on classical game-theoretical modeling -are modified by the introduction of Hilbert space? In our earlier work [7, 8, 9, 10] we explored the relevance of the concept of evolutionarily stability in quantum game theory. The concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) [11] describe well the stable states of a population resulting from dynamics of evolution. In other words ESS is a symmetric Nash equilibria robust against small mutations [12] . We explored how an ESS, existing in classical scenario, continues to exist or disappears while a switch-over to quantum domain occurs. We showed that a switch-over to quantum domain can lead to appearance or disappearance of the property of evolutionarily stability from a symmetric Nash equilibria [7, 10] In order to draw a comparison between classical and quantum version of a game for ESS, it is important to ensure the Nash equilibrium remains same in two versions.
In evolutionary game theory mixed strategies plays a very significant role. The Bishop-Cannings theorem (BCT) [13] deals with mixed ESS in game theory. It is found useful to introduce the concept of support of an ESS to explain more easily the BCT [15, 14] . Suppose strategy vector p = (p i ) is an ESS. Its support S(p) is the set S(p) = {i : p i > 0}. Thus the support of p is the set of pure strategies that can be played by a p-player. BCT states that if p is an ESS with support I and r = p is an ESS with support J, then I J. For the two-player two-strategy games the BCT shows that no pure strategy can be evolutionarily stable when a mixed ESS exists [14] . In earlier papers, for a particular choice of initial quantum state, i.e., |ψ ini = a |1, 1 + b |2, 2 -where 1 and 2 represent the classical pure strategies and |a| 2 + |b| 2 = 1 -we showed that evolutionarily stability of a pure strategy in a two-player, two-strategy, symmetric quantum game can be controlled by parameters of initial quantum state [7, 8] . However, the evolutionarily stability of a mixed NE cannot be changed by controlling parameters of initial quantum state in this form. In a separate study [9] , our results showed that the evolutionary study can be controlled by parameters of initial quantum state if number of players is increased to three instead of two. In all these studies we considered situations where corresponding symmetric NE remain intact in quantum and classical versions of the game.
In present paper, following the approach developed for the quantum version of the rock-scissor-paper (RSP) game [10] , we consider a general form of the initial pure quantum state. Our results show that for this form of initial quantum state, the corresponding quantum version of a bimatrix game leads to evolutionarily stability for a mixed symmetric NE, although classically this NE is not stable. It is interesting to observe that by ensuring evolutionarily stability to a mixed NE in a quantum form of the game, the BCT forces out the pure ESSs present in classical form of the game.
Evolutionarily stability of a mixed NE
In a classical symmetric bimatrix game, played in an evolutionary set up involving a population, all the members of population are indistinguishable and each individual is equally likely to face each other. Suppose that the finite set of pure strategies {1, ..., n} is available to each player. Player 1 receives a reward a ij by playing strategy i against player 2 playing strategy j. Player 2, then, gets a ji as a reward. The value a ij is an element in the n × n payoff matrix M. We assume that instead of a pure strategy, the players have an option to play a mixed strategy. It means he/she plays the strategy i with probability p i for all i = 1, ..., n. A strategy vector p, with components p i , represents the mixed strategy played by the player. In standard notation an average, or expected, payoff for player 1, playing strategy p, against player 2 ,playing q, is written as
where T is for transpose. Suppose that the strategy p is played by almost all members of the population, the rest of population being a small mutant group constituting a fraction ǫ of the total population playing q. p is said to be evolutionarily stable against q if
for all sufficiently small ǫ. Thus p does better against the mean population strategy than q does. The condition (2) implies that either (i)
The vector p is said to be an ESS if p is evolutionarily stable against all q = p.
In fact the payoff to a player in the quantized version of rock-scissors-paper (RSP) game [10] can also be written in similar form to (1), provided the matrix M is replaced with a matrix corresponding to quantum version of this game. In RSP game each player has access to three pure strategies, represented by 1, 2, and 3, and the game is given by the following matrix Alice ′ s strategy
where, for example, (α 23 , α 32 ) means that Alice and Bob get α 23 and α 32 , respectively, when Alice plays the strategy 2 and Bob plays 3. In quantized version of the game the players apply unitary operators I, C, and D,-on an initial quantum state-that are defined as follows [4, 10] 
where
and I is the identity operator. Suppose Alice applies the operators C, D, and I with probabilities p, p 1, and (1 −
The payoff to Alice who plays the strategy p (where
where the matrix ω is given by
and the elements of ω are 
In a symmetric game the exchange of strategies by Alice and Bob also exchanges their respective payoffs. The concept of an ESS was originally defined for symmetric games where a player's payoff is given by his strategy and his identity does not affect it [11, 6] . It is seen that the quantum game corresponding to the matrix (3), when played using the initial quantum state of eq. (5), becomes symmetric when
The two-player quantum game-with three pure strategies-has a form similar to a classical matrix game. The payoff matrix of the classical game is, however, replaced now with its quantum version (7) . Also the matrix (7) involves the coefficients c ij of the initial quantum state (5). The matrix (7) is reduced to its classical form-given in (3)-by making the initial state unentangled i.e. 
It is now a two-player two-strategy game played with the pure initial state (5). The available pure strategies are now 1 and 3 only and the terms with subscripts containing 2 disappear. Take x = 1 − p and y = 1 − q, so that x and y are probabilities with which players apply identity operator on the initial state |ψ ini . The strategy vectors p and q can now be represented only by the numbers x and y, respectively. Payoff to a x-player against a y-player is then obtained as
also from (10)
From eqs. (14) and (15) we get α 33 − α 13 = α 11 − α 31 and then
. Therefore, the mixed strategy x ⋆ = 1 2 can be a NE in both classical and a quantum form of the game. This mixed NE, which is not an ESS classically, can become an ESS when (ω 11 −ω 31 −ω 13 +ω 33 ) < 0. Given (α 11 −α 13 −α 31 +α 33 ) > 0 and eq. (15) it is possible if
Because the game remains symmetric, in its quantum form as well, provided |c 11 | 2 = |c 33 | 2 and |c 13 | 2 = |c 31 | 2 , therefore, the inequality (16) means |c 11 | 2 < |c 13 | 2 . Similar analysis can also be repeated for the strategy x ⋆ = 1 2 , when it is an ESS classically.
Therefore, a quantum version of a symmetric bimatrix classical game of the matrix (α 11 , α 11 ) (α 13 , α 31 ) (α 31 , α 13 ) (α 33 , α 33 )
can be played by two unitary operators and a pure two-qubit quantum state of the form
. When α 33 − α 13 = α 11 − α 31 the mixed strategy
is not an ESS in the classical game if (α 33 − α 13 ) > 0. Nevertheless, the strategy x ⋆ = 1 2 becomes an ESS when |c 11 | 2 < |c 13 | 2 . In case (α 33 − α 13 ) < 0 the strategy x ⋆ = 1 2 is an ESS classically but does not remain so if |c 11 | 2 < |c 13 | 2 .
Let now suppose |c 13 | 2 = |c 31 | 2 = 0. We then have from (15)
So that, in the quantum form of the game played by an initial state of the form
it is not possible that the mixed strategy x ⋆ = 1 2 is an ESS in only one form of the game (classical or quantum) when it is a symmetric NE in both. A switchover of the bimatrix game to a quantum form-achieved by playing the game with state (20)-cannot change evolutionarily stability of the mixed NE. However a quantum turn of the game affects evolutionarily stability of the mixed NE when the game is played with two-qubit pure state of the form (18).
Discussion and conclusion
Evolutionary games, considered in this paper, are formal models of strategic interaction [16] having some notable elements (a) higher payoff strategies displace, over time, the lower payoff strategies, as specified by a dynamic that underlies the game, (b) there is some inertia, (c) players do not systematically attempt to influence other players' future actions. Condition (a) describes the Darwin's maxim of "survival of the fittest". Evolutionary games were originally developed by biologists and mathematicians to address substantive questions in evolutionary biology. Economists found evolutionary games useful to investigate game-theoretical solution concepts, especially NE and selection among multiple NE. Economic fields where evolutionary games have applications are like industrial organization, law, economic development, and international trade. Biologists originally borrowed the basic idea of evolution from economists and social philosophers, especially Malthus (1798).
Compared to game theory and evolutionary game theory the idea of playing a game by quantum rules has been presented very recently by Meyer [1] . In his consideration of zero-sum quantum games, Meyer's original motivation for the study of quantum games was to have a new starting point at hand to find quantum algorithms that outperform its classical analogue. Apart from these implications for quantum information theory, it is shown recently that quite interesting situations may also come out of the bigger picture provided to the classical game theory by the introduction of Hilbert structure in game theory. The disappearance of dilemma, when the famous prisoner's dilemma game is played in a quantum way, is one such example studied early in the history of quantum games. We indicated another motivation for a study of quantum games that looks at the established game-theoretical concepts derived from evolutionary dynamics of a population in new quantum settings: because much of the mathematical analysis of evolution has been achieved using classical game theory. We found that the recent extension of game theory to quantum domain asks for a revision of concepts and ideas of the part of game theory developed for the study of evolution. Because the ESS idea is central in evolutionary game theory, the question how ESSs are affected, when a game takes a quantum form, clearly interrelates the presence of entanglement to the course and the direction the evolutionary dynamics takes.
Mixed ESSs appear as stable outcomes in many games of interest that are played in the natural world. The examples of the rock-scissors-paper (RSP) and the hawks and doves (Hs&Ds) are well known from evolutionary game theory. In two-player two-strategy games, the BCT makes vanish pure ESSs whenever a mixed ESS appears. In these games, when a switch-over to a quantum form changes the evolutionarily stability of a mixed strategy, there appear certain requirements about the forms of initial states of two-qubit quantum systems.
We conclude our results as follows. In a symmetric bimatrix classical game a mixed NE is distinguished by the fact that its support contains both pure strategies. We studied evolutionarily stability of a mixed NE as the game changes to one of its quantized forms. So as to study how stability of a mixed symmetric NE can be affected by a switch-over to a quantum form of the game, we selected a mixed NE that survives when the game changes from classical to quantum version or conversely. We examined the mixed NE when it is an ESS in only one form of the game. We found that a two-qubit quantum state-that also corresponds to one of quantum forms of the game-in its more general form is needed, as opposed to the initial quantum state required to affect evolutionarily stability of the pure strategies.
